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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, the Minnesota Legislature created the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) as an executive branch court. The 
legislature intended to create an efficient, flexible, less-expensive, and 
neutral forum to support—but not supplant—administrative agency 
decision-making.1 Since that time, the legislature passed numerous statutes 
placing final decision-making authority in OAH’s hands, rather than 
 
 †   Ann E. Cohen is a senior staff attorney at the Minnesota Center for 
Environmental Advocacy. Ms. Cohen received her B.A. from Yale University and J.D. 
from New York University School of Law. Ms. Cohen previously spent thirty-two years 
working for the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office representing the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency.  
Elise L. Larson is a staff attorney at the Minnesota Center for Environmental 
Advocacy. Ms. Larson received her B.A. from Concordia College, Moorhead and J.D. 
from the University of Minnesota Law School.  
The authors would like to thank their collegues at the Minnesota Center for 
Environmental Advocacy, and former Chief Administrative Law Judge Beverly Jones 
Heydinger, for their support and helpful comments.  
 1. Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 16, § 15.052, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1293–95 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 14.001–.69 (2018)). 
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having the courts or administrative agencies make those final decisions.2 In 
doing so, the legislature created a questionable system where the powers 
granted to OAH invade the provinces of the executive and judicial branch 
established under the Minnesota Constitution.  
 This article explores the separation of powers concerns created 
where the legislature gave OAH authority to make final decisions. The 
article begins with a broad overview of Minnesota’s separation of powers 
principles and the creation of OAH.3 The article then discusses cases 
deciding claims where administrative courts interfered with judicial power 
and explores how OAH’s authority to issue final agency decisions fits 
under those precedents.4 Next, the article addresses separation of powers 
concerns created when the legislature grants OAH final agency decision-
making authority within the executive branch that can trump what would 
otherwise have been another administrative agency’s decision.5 The article 
concludes with suggested legislative actions that could be taken to protect 
both OAH’s authority and the three separate, yet equal, branches of 
government.6 
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES  
One can only understand the constitutional concerns raised when 
OAH acts as the final decision-maker by understanding the intersection of 
the separation of powers concerns and the rise of administrative agencies. 
“The separation of powers doctrine, as set out in the constitutions of both 
the United States and Minnesota has roots deep in the history of Anglo-
American political philosophy.”7 The doctrine, as expressed by political 
philosophers such as John Locke and Montesquieu, “is based on the 
principle that when the government’s power is concentrated in one of its 
branches, tyranny and corruption will result.”8 As explained in The 
Federalist No. 47:  
 
 2. MINN. STAT. §§ 14.57–.70 (2012).  
 3. See infra Parts II, III.  
 4. See infra Part IV.  
 5. See infra Part V.  
 6. See infra Part VI.  
 7. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Minn. 1979) (citing 
Reginald Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 451–64 (1957)). 
 8. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999); see also Wulff, 288 
N.W.2d at 222–23 (noting that an administrative agency’s constitutionality is determined by 
“a critical analysis of its function in conjunction with an examination of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.”). 
2
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The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . In order to form 
correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to 
investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires 
that the three great departments of power should be separate 
and distinct.9  
Yet, separation of powers has never meant an “absolute division of 
our government’s functions.”10 Said another way, the branches of 
government are not completely separate, but operate through “institutional 
interdependence.”11 Even the founding fathers understood the branches 
could not function if totally divided.12 Consequently, the separation-of-
powers doctrine operates in a paradox—constitutional provisions mandate 
separation even though complete separation is impossible to attain.13  
In Minnesota, the separation of powers doctrine was adopted in 
article III, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, which reads: “The 
powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments: 
legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or 
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers 
properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly 
provided in this constitution.”14 Some scholars have interpreted the 
constitutional language as “install[ing] a rigid separation of powers in 
Minnesota,” perhaps more rigid than the U.S. Constitution.15 The 
Democratic faction of the Minnesota Constitution’s framers drafted the 
ratified language, and the preserved history of debates surrounding the 
language indicates that the Minnesota framers both modeled the provision 
 
 9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob Earnest Cooke ed., 
1961).  
 10. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 723.  
 11. Id. at 723, n.20.  
 12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 9, at 325 (“[W]e must perceive that the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and 
distinct from each other.”). 
 13. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979) (noting that 
Madison’s own statement “presupposes that some functions of one branch may be 
performed by another branch without subverting the Constitution”).  
 14. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 15. Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of 
Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1246, 1256 (1986) 
(“The Minnesota Constitution mandates a separation of powers at least as strict as that 
required by the federal Constitution; indeed, the Minnesota scheme appears even more 
rigid.”). 
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after the constitutions of other states and “emphasize[d] the importance of 
a strict separation of powers.”16 Since ratification in 1857, the separation of 
powers provision has never been amended—even when the Minnesota 
Constitution was generally revised in 1974.17  
 Despite this static constitutional language, Minnesota’s government 
“has grown larger and more complicated.”18 One of those complexities is 
“[t]he rise of the administrative agency”;19 in particular, administrative 
agencies that resemble the type of power traditionally held by the 
legislative, judicial, and executive branches.20 Such “blurred boundaries 
between government branches” have increasingly made “the separation of 
powers doctrine . . . harder to define.”21 OAH, in particular, is an 
administrative agency that blurs the boundaries between the government 
branches.22   
III.  A BRIEF LOOK AT OAH  
Minnesota first adopted a version of the Minnesota Administrative 
Procedure Act (“MAPA”) in 1945.23 Until 1975, MAPA required agencies 
to administer administrative hearings either through department heads or 
by hiring hearing examiners to develop a record of decision.24 Exacerbated 
by increasingly complex law and authority, MAPA administration within 
the agencies, at a minimum, gave the appearance of “kangaroo courts” due 
to the “lack of procedural uniformity and expertise in conducting hearings, 
delays due to unavailability, and manpower shortages in the agencies from 
 
 16. Id. at 1256 n.82 (citing W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 119 (1921); FRANCIS H. SMITH, THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 185–202 (1857)). 
 17. Id. at 1256 n.82, 1257.  
 18. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999). 
 19. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979). 
 20. See id.  
 21. Holmberg, 558 N.W.2d at 723. 
 22. See id. at 722–23. 
 23. Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and 
Effective: How the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257, 
257 (1981); BRUCE H. JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES AND THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 2–15 (2011), 
https://mn.gov/oah/assets/APAHistoryJohnson_tcm19-81576.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DH9-
7LM8] (outlining administrative law origins in Minnesota and MAPA’s development 
between 1949 and 1975). 
 24. Harves, supra note 23, at 257–58; JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 15. 
4
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which the employee [decisionmaker] was drawn.”25 Further, there were 
concerns that informal rulemaking went unexamined under a system 
where agencies controlled the MAPA process.26 The culmination of these 
concerns led the Minnesota Legislature to adopt the Act of June 4, 1975, 
creating OAH and re-codifying MAPA in chapter 14 of the Minnesota 
Statutes (“Chapter 14”).27 
Under Chapter 14, the Minnesota Legislature adopted a “central 
panel system,”28 creating an efficient, flexible, and less expensive forum for 
decision-making29 and addressing concerns about agency impartiality, 
consistency, and accountability in hearings and rulemaking.30 Chapter 14 
establishes OAH as an executive branch agency.31 Under the new system, 
OAH serves as a place where an aggrieved party can resolve administrative 
disputes involving an executive branch agency, board, or commission 
(“agency”) with the help of a neutral arbiter.32 OAH handles a wide variety 
of cases, including utility rates, electric and natural gas transmission routes, 
“child care and foster care license regulation, veteran’s preferences, 
occupational safety and health, professional licenses, nursing home rates 
and regulatory compliance, environmental permits, human rights, 
personnel disputes involving government employees, fair campaign 
practices complaints, municipal boundary adjustment matters, and other 
challenges to state and local government action.”33 OAH also reviews the 
need for and reasonableness of all rules proposed by state agencies.34  
 
 25. Harves, supra note 23, at 258; see also Raymond Krause, Minnesota’s OAH: 30 
Years of Innovation in Administrative Review, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2006, at 17, 17–18 
(describing Minnesota’s administrative process before 1975).  
 26. Harves, supra note 23, at 258; see also Krause, supra note 25, at 17–18 
(describing concerns regarding Minnesota’s rulemaking procedures before 1975).  
 27. See Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 16, § 15.052, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1293–
95 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 14.001–.69 (2018)). 
 28. Malcom Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65 
JUDICATURE 246, 247 (1981) (examining the Minnesota system as a “central panel 
system”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17 (noting Minnesota was “the country’s fifth 
independent central panel”).  
 29. Harves, supra note 23, at 260–61, 263–64 (discussing administrative flexibility, 
cost reductions, and faster processing resulting from the Minnesota central panel system).  
 30. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17.  
 31. Id.  
 32. MINN. STAT. § 14.50 (2018); see also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17 (labeling 
central panel systems as “independent” and describing how Minnesota’s central panel was 
created to ensure independence).  
 33. About Us, MINN. OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, https://mn.gov/oah/about-us/overall/ 
[https://perma.cc/9SCN-GT97]. 
 34. MINN. STAT. §§ 14.14, subdiv. 2, 14.26, subdiv. 3, 14.50 (2018). 
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From its creation, the legislature intended OAH to be independent 
from the governor and other executive branch agencies.35 The legislature 
placed OAH under the direction of the Chief Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) “who, in turn, was authorized to appoint a sufficient number of 
other [ALJs] to conduct business.”36 Although the governor appoints the 
Chief ALJ, the appointment requires the advice and consent of the 
Minnesota Senate, and the Chief ALJ serves a six-year term—two years 
longer than the governor’s term.37 The legislature aimed to ensure OAH’s 
independence and developed a structure to insulate the Chief ALJ “from 
any undue political pressure in terms of assigning certain persons to hear 
specific cases, and from pressure to be sure decisions were rendered in a 
certain fashion with predetermined results.”38 The legislature also 
specifically sheltered ALJs appointed by the Chief ALJ from political 
influence,39 and required that all ALJs “must be free of any political or 
economic association that would impair their ability to function in a fair 
and impartial manner.”40 Significantly, the legislature classified ALJs as 
“employees in the state civil service and therefore subject to all of the 
protections associated with that status.”41  
In light of the independence Chapter 14 affords OAH from the 
executive branch, ALJs generally do not render final decisions for another 
executive branch agency. Instead, an ALJ’s role is to create the factual 
record42 through a relatively informal and expedited proceeding,43 and 
 
 35. Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within an Administrative 
Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 448–49 (2001); see 
also Harves, supra note 23, at 259 (“The structure of [OAH] makes it an independent state 
agency.”); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994) (noting Minnesota’s central panel is “housed in [a] 
completely independent agenc[y] in the executive branch.”).  
 36. Johnson, supra note 35, at 448.  
 37. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 2.  
 38. Harves, supra note 23, at 259. 
 39. Johnson, supra note 35, at 449.  
 40. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3(b).  
 41. Johnson, supra note 35, at 449; see also MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3(a) (“All 
administrative law judges and compensation judges shall be in the classified service except 
that the chief administrative law judge shall be in the unclassified service, but may be 
removed only for cause.”).  
 42. MINN. STAT. § 14.50 (establishing an OAH is charged with providing procedural 
due process, establishing a record, and issuing a recommendation). The dispute could be 
over a specific matter. For example, a denied or revoked permit, a proposed rule, or 
amendment to a rule. Regardless, OAH’s role is to establish a record. Id.  
 43. See MINN. R. 1400.7300 (2019) (simplifying the rules of evidence for OAH’s 
contested-case hearings). 
6
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make a recommendation to the executive branch agency with jurisdiction 
to make the final decision (“jurisdictional agency”).44 Based on that record 
and recommendation, the jurisdictional agency then decides the matter, 
issues the final order, must defend that order on appeal, and must be 
politically accountable for its decision.45 The jurisdictional agency is not 
required to agree with the ALJ’s decision and, instead, makes an 
independent decision based on the jurisdictional agency’s interpretation of 
the facts in the record and its application of the law to those facts.46 
However, the jurisdictional agency must defend its order on appeal and be 
politically accountable for its decision.47 This decision represents the 
executive branch’s final action, which the Minnesota Court of Appeals can 
review under its writ of certiorari jurisdiction, if a complaining party 
appeals.48 The court will uphold the jurisdictional agency’s decision where 
it is supported by “substantial evidence” in the record, and notably, this 
standard of review is not heightened where the jurisdictional agency’s final 
decision differs from the ALJ’s recommendation.49  
 But this model has broken down. Now, parts of Chapter 14 and 
other state laws50 make OAH the final arbiter of issues affecting executive 
branch agencies, rather than allowing the agencies to make the final call.51 
 
 44. This article uses the term “jurisdictional agency” to refer to the agency that has 
statutory authority and control over a particular area. For example, under section 93.481 of 
the Minnesota Statutes, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources would be the 
jurisdictional agency with regard to regulation of mining operations. 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 14.50.  
 46. MINN. STAT. § 14.15, subdiv. 3. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 115 (2018). It is worth remembering that, at one point, 
it was an open question whether the executive branch could decide its own disputes. In 
Breimhorst v. Beckman, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the question of 
whether the Minnesota Legislature’s delegation of adjudicatory powers to the Industrial 
Commissioner violated the separation of powers. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 733–34 
(1949). The court held that it did not “as long as the commission’s awards and 
determinations are not only subject to review by certiorari[] but lack judicial finality in not 
being enforceable by execution or other process in the absence of a binding judgment 
entered thereon by a duly established court.” Id. at 734. 
 49. See, e.g., In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 
N.W.2d 264, 278 (Minn. 2001). 
 50. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.085 (providing that OAH may issue an order, 
including imposing penalties, if it finds that a government entity has violated the Minnesota 
Data Practices Act). “A party aggrieved” by this decision can, however, appeal to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, although not under Chapter 14. MINN. STAT. § 13.085, 
subdiv. 5(d) (2018). 
 51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 200.04, subdiv. 3; 216A.037, subdiv. 4; 442A.04. 
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The Minnesota Legislature, perhaps hostile to the “administrative state,”52 
or perhaps hostile to a particular governor, may start to favor such 
arrangements.53 These statutes are the subject of this article. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS VERSUS THE JUDICIAL BRANCH  
 The Minnesota Supreme Court has had the opportunity to delve 
into the constitutional intersection of administrative courts and the judicial 
branch on a few occasions. In some occasions, but not all, the court has 
held that assigning power to an administrative court to decide disputes was 
unconstitutional under separation-of-power principles because the 
administrative court improperly acted as a judicial-branch court.54  
 The court first faced the constitutionality of an administrative court 
in Breimhorst v. Beckman.55 There, the court addressed whether the 
Workman’s Compensation Act (“WCA”) violated the Minnesota 
Constitution by encroaching on judicial power.56 Under the WCA, an 
injured employee could only bring an employment injury claim before an 
executive-branch commission rather than in district court.57 An injured 
employee claimed, in part, that the WCA’s mandate that injured 
employees use the executive-branch commission rather than the court 
system violated the separation of powers.58 The court disagreed, holding 
that vesting the executive-branch commission with quasi-judicial powers 
did not violate the “state constitutional provisions for the division of the 
 
 52. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Is Trump Restoring the Separation of Powers, NAT’L 
REV. (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/11/donald-trump-
separation-powers-solid-job/ [https://perma.cc/PL5B-KNSL]. It would appear that those 
who are suspicious of agency actions would rather have judges decide the matters based on 
their own interpretation of the law, rather than defer to agency interpretation. 
 53. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 15, at 1237. There are also statutes that attempt to 
wrest executive powers to take rules back from the executive and place those powers with 
legislative committees, or at least give legislative committees the authority to delay a rule 
that the executive attempts to adopt. As many have already commented on the 
unconstitutional nature of such provisions, and because such provisions are not directly 
related to OAH, this article will not address these provisions. 
 54. Such conflicts may, in fact, result from administrative courts publicly presenting 
that the administrative office performs a judicial function. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 35, 
at 473 (“[S]trengthening professionalism necessarily involves taking steps that show the 
public that [OAH’s] judges possess the requisite judicial qualities and that they do conduct 
themselves in the ways that the public expects judges to behave.” (emphasis added)).  
 55. 35 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1949). 
 56. Id. at 732. 
 57. Id. at 724, 732.  
 58. Id. at 733–34.  
8
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powers of government or for the vesting of judicial power in the courts.”59 
The court reasoned that “as long as the commission’s awards and 
determinations are not only subject to review by certiorari, but lack judicial 
finality in not being enforceable by execution or other process in the 
absence of a binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established 
court,” the commission did not unlawfully encroach upon the judicial 
branch.60  
 Thirty years later, the court walked back this broad 
pronouncement, concluding Breimhorst “mark[ed] the outside limit of 
allowable quasi-judicial power in Minnesota.”61 In Wulff, the court 
considered whether the legislature could, without infringing on the judicial 
power, “constitutionally establish the Tax Court, an administrative agency, 
as the sole arbitrator of tax disputes.”62 The court expressed serious 
concerns with the tax court structure, both because the tax court did not 
fulfill a pressing social need and “[u]nlike decisions of most administrative 
agencies . . . which require judicial enforcement, Tax Court decisions, 
upon filing, automatically become orders of the court.”63 Despite these 
concerns, the court held the tax court did not violate the separation of 
powers.64 The court based its holding on several factors. First, the subject 
matter: Minnesota courts had consistently concluded taxation was 
“‘primarily a legislative function,’” distinguishing taxation from other 
administrative adjudications and allowing for “more latitude in permitting 
such a delegation.”65 Second, under the statute, “the taxpayer always has 
the option to file in district court. . . . perhaps the saving feature of this 
statutory scheme.”66 Finally, the court observed that “any transfer to the 
Tax Court is discretionary with the district court” and all tax court 
decisions are subject to the “ultimate check on administrative power in the 
form of review as of right in” the Minnesota Supreme Court.67 For these 
reasons, the court determined the legislature did not “usurp judicial 
functions nor deprive taxpayers of constitutional rights” with the creation 
of the Tax Court.68  
 
 59. Id. at 734.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979). 
 62. Id. at 222.  
 63. Id. at 223–24.  
 64. Id. at 225.  
 65. Id. at 224 (quoting State v. Erickson, 221 Minn. 218, 225, 3 N.W.2d 231, 235 
(1942)). 
 66. Id. at 225.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
9
Cohen and Larson: Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Separation of Powers and the Office of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL 485 
 The court distinguished Wulff in the late 1990s with Holmberg v. 
Holmberg.69 The issue raised in Holmberg was whether Minnesota’s 
administrative child-support process “violate[s] the separation of powers 
doctrine by impinging upon the original jurisdiction of the district court, by 
creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the district court, and by 
permitting child support officers to engage in the practice of law.”70 The 
court described the “flexible review standard” for whether an 
administrative court unlawfully encroaches on the judiciary.71 The court 
summarized the standard as follows:  
While supreme court decisions following Breimhorst have 
relied, in part, on public policy to affirm legislatively created 
administrative schemes, they have also been shaped by the 
existence of adequate judicial checks on administrative actors, 
the function delegated, ALJ decision appealability, voluntariness 
of entry into the administrative system, and whether the 
legislative delegation is comprehensive or piecemeal.72 
Applying these criteria, the court determined the administrative child-
support process violated the separation of powers on three separate 
grounds.73 First, the court concluded the process impinged on the 
judiciary’s original jurisdiction as the legislature had “delegated to an 
executive agency the [judicial branch’s] inherent equitable power” violating 
article VI, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution.74 Second, the court 
found the system violated article VI, section 3 of the Minnesota 
Constitution, because the system gave ALJs “the power to modify district 
court decisions,”75 making ALJs “‘on par’ with, if not ‘superior’ to the 
district courts [the Minnesota Constitution] established.”76 Third, the 
 
 69. 588 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 1999). 
 70. Id. at 721. 
 71. Id. at 725.  
 72. Id. (citations omitted).  
 73. Id. at 726.  
 74. Id. at 725–26. The court also addressed the improper delegation of judicial 
authority within the judicial branch in State v. Harris, 667 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. 2003). 
There, the court found a statute allowing a chief district judge to appoint non-elected 
judicial officers to any district court matter violated article VI, section 1 of the Minnesota 
Constitution because the constitution mandates that non-elected judicial officers “be 
inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.” Id. at 917–20. 
 75. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.  
 76. Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Minn. 2018). In Otto, the state 
auditor challenged a state law permitting counties to choose their auditor. Id. The state 
auditor, citing Holmberg, argued the statute violated the separation of powers because it 
transferred “the executive department’s authority to control and conduct audits from a 
constitutional officer to counties and private entities.” Id. at 454–55. The court disagreed, 
10
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process “infring[ed] on the court’s exclusive power to supervise the 
practice of law” by permitting non-lawyer, child-support officers to engage 
in the practice of law.77 The court further concluded that appellate review 
did not save the process from infringing on judicial powers because many 
participants in the process lacked “the resources to mount an appeal” 
under the “mandatory, albeit piecemeal, process.”78  
 Interestingly, despite OAH’s existence in its current form for more 
than forty years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to analyze whether 
OAH’s quasi-judicial decision-making—in any form—violates the 
separation of powers because it encroaches on judicial power. But the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals engaged in this inquiry in Riley v. 
Jankowski.79 Specifically, the court considered whether a statute permitting 
OAH to impose civil penalties for unfair campaign practices violated the 
separation of powers by unlawfully infringing on the judicial branch.80 In 
Riley, a political candidate filed a complaint with OAH alleging relators 
disseminated false campaign material.81 An OAH panel held a two-day 
evidentiary hearing and issued an order finding relators disseminated false 
campaign material.82 The panel further ordered the relators to pay a civil 
fine.83 Relators appealed, arguing the OAH hearing process was invalid 
because, rather than deciding issues relating to an administrative agency, 
 
distinguishing Holmberg on the ground that the state auditor retained “substantial and 
substantive responsibilities in connection with county audits.” Id. at 455.  
 77. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726. As discussed briefly infra Part V.B, the court 
engaged on the intersection between administrative courts and the judiciary’s authority to 
supervise the practice of law in Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 
1983). There, a statute allowed an administrative agency to set attorney fees in workers’ 
compensation cases. Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 750. In that case, the court held the statute did 
not violate the separation of powers, reasoning the judiciary still had the authority to review 
all attorney fee decisions and states around the country uniformly used this practice. Id. at 
752–53. Twelve years later, the legislature amended the statute to create a “maximum 
permissible fee” and limited the power of the court to evaluate the appropriateness to the 
fee award. Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Minn. 1999). The Irwin court 
held “[l]egislation that prohibits this court from deviating from the precise statutory amount 
of awardable attorney fees impinges on the judiciary’s inherent power to oversee attorneys 
and attorney fees by depriving this court of a final, independent review of attorney fees.” Id. 
at 141–42. The court reasoned that it has an “inherent power to oversee attorneys and 
attorney fees” and delegating attorney fee regulation to the executive branch violated the 
separation of powers. Id.  
 78. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.  
 79. 713 N.W.2d 379, 382–83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 80. Id. at 382.  
 81. Id. at 385.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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OAH considered individual complaints, determined factually whether 
statutory provisions were violated, and issued a final decision, which to 
relators, were all inherently judicial functions.84 Among other arguments, 
relators asserted that the OAH process violated the separation of powers 
because the OAH was not inferior to the district court, but rather on par 
with district courts in deciding whether the statute was violated.85 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, contending that, under 
Breimhorst, the process did not violate the separation of powers because 
the final administrative decision was reviewable by writ of certiorari.86 
Furthermore, relators failed to “demonstrate[] that an order from an ALJ 
panel is enforceable by execution or other process in the absence of a 
binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established court.”87 The 
court distinguished Holmberg, stating that “[u]nlike the ALJs in 
Holmberg, [OAH] cannot modify a district court decision; their decisions 
are not granted the same deference as a district court order on appeal; and 
they do not take the place of the district court in criminal proceedings.”88  
The Minnesota Court of Appeal’s reliance on Breimhorst, rather 
than Holmberg, to analyze whether the unfair campaign practices statute’s 
OAH process violated the separation of powers presents an interesting 
dilemma. The Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly stated in Wulff that 
Breimhorst marked the “outside limit of allowable quasi-judicial power in 
Minnesota.”89 And, as laid out above, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
expressed numerous factors which are relevant to the inquiry in 
Holmberg, rather than the two Briemhorst factors the court relied on in 
Riley, including “the existence of adequate judicial checks on 
administrative actors, the function delegated, ALJ decision appealability, 
voluntariness of entry into the administrative system, and whether the 
legislative delegation is comprehensive or piecemeal.”90 
Considering the Holmberg factors, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
too, simply dismissed the separation of powers concerns presented in 
Riley.91 For example, Holmberg suggests that courts consider 
“voluntariness of entry into the administrative system” in determining 
 
 84. Id. at 387. 
 85. Id. at 392.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 395. 
 89. Id. at 388 (quoting Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 
(Minn.1979)). 
 90. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 1999).  
 91. Id. 
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whether an administrative process violates the separation of powers.92 In 
fact, the Wulff court expressed that the tax court likely would have violated 
the separation of powers, but-for the taxpayer’s option to file in district 
court.93 Yet, when the Riley relator argued that OAH violated the 
separation of powers because the system was involuntary, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals dismissed the argument on the ground that “involuntary 
participation in an administrative process does not indicate a separation-of-
powers violation when a decision rendered in the administrative process is 
subject to judicial review.”94 Such analysis completely disregards the court’s 
reasoning in Holmberg, which rejected an administrative court system that 
provided for judicial review.95  
 Another unanalyzed element in Riley that amounted to a saving 
grace in Wulff was the “piecemeal” versus “comprehensive” system.96 In 
Breimhorst, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, in part, that it was the 
comprehensive nature of the system that created fewer separation of 
powers concerns.97 In contrast, the process in Holmberg did not pass 
constitutional muster, in part, because the piecemeal system dealt with 
only one portion of the custody and child support process.98 In Riley, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals cited Breimhorst as authority to distinguish 
OAH’s authority regarding unfair campaign practices.99 But such an 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 225 (“It is crucial to note that the taxpayer always has the 
option to file in district court. This is perhaps the saving feature of this statutory scheme.” 
(citation omitted)).  
 94. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Meath v. 
Harmful Substance Comp. Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Minn. 1996) (Anderson, J., 
concurring)).  
 95. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726 (concluding appellate review did not save the 
process from infringing on judicial powers).  
 96. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 391 (quoting Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 724–25); Wulff, 
288 N.W.2d at 225 (“[W]e find no violation . . . since an individual with a tax dispute does 
not go remediless. A remedy is provided by the tax court, subject to and including judicial 
review.”). 
 97. Breimhorst v. Beckmann, 277 Minn. 409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn. 
1949) (holding the Workmen’s Compensation Commission did not violate the separation 
of powers “as long as the commission’s awards and determinations [were] not only subject 
to review by certiorari, but lack[ed] judicial finality in not being enforceable by execution or 
other process in the absence of binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established 
court”). 
 98. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.  
 99. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 395 (“[W]e conclude that the process is much more similar 
to the process in Breimhorst, which the supreme court concluded did not violate the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, than to the process that the supreme court invalidated in 
Holmberg.”). 
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analysis is inconsistent with the case law for two reasons. First, the process 
in Riley was admittedly piecemeal, as a criminal process also existed to 
punish the same conduct.100 Second, and more importantly, Breimhorst’s 
analysis was directly called into question in Wulff.101 Thus, it is 
questionable for the Minnesota Court of Appeals to affirm the process in 
Riley on the ground that it is “much more similar to the process in 
Breimhorst.”102  
 Consequently, the only case law addressing the constitutionality of 
an OAH process where OAH acts as a final decision-maker is 
questionable at best. However, the legislature is not without options. The 
legislature could take steps to ensure the constitutional powers remain 
separated, while still allowing OAH to act as a final decision-maker. The 
Breimhorst court suggested that a comprehensive and permissive 
administrative process that avoids matters within the traditional province of 
the judiciary is far more likely to pass constitutional muster than a 
mandatory, piecemeal administrative processes that meddles in subjects 
traditionally controlled by the judicial branch.103  
 Having discussed the case law regarding administrative courts and 
separation of powers from a judicial branch perspective, this article next 
delves into the muddier realm of inter-executive branch conflict created 
when OAH—or another independent administrative court—acts as the final 
decision-maker.  
V. OAH VERSUS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Although the line is murky, as discussed above, Minnesota courts 
have cabined administrative courts away from certain district court 
functions based on the Minnesota Constitution’s provisions regarding 
establishment of the courts. But this is only half the story. The other half 
of the story is how OAH and other administrative courts function within 
the executive branch. 
 
 100. See id.  
 101. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223–24 (Minn.1979) (“Unlike 
decisions of most administrative agencies, such as the one reviewed in Breimhorst, which 
require judicial enforcement, Tax Court decisions, upon filing, automatically become 
orders of the court. It is precisely this type of impingement by other branches of 
government on the judiciary that concerns us. In view of the aforementioned, we are 
reticent to approve such a legislative scheme.”). 
 102. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 395. 
 103. See Breimhorst v. Beckmann, 277 Minn. 409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn. 
1949). 
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A. Constitutional Powers of the Executive Branch 
The Minnesota Constitution and the U.S. Constitution have similar 
provisions governing the branches of government, including the powers 
granted to the executive. Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that 
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America.”104 Under Article II, the president is given the authority and 
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”105 
Minnesota’s Constitution is firmer in its division of the powers of 
government into three branches, stating “[n]o person or persons belonging 
to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the 
powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances 
expressly provided in this constitution.”106 But the executive’s authority 
found in Minnesota’s Constitution is just the same as the U.S. 
Constitution: the governor “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”107  
With the rise of the administrative state, federal courts confronted the 
fact that the executive could not always run the show alone and, as a result, 
gulped and swallowed on the theory that the president could not carry out 
the executive power without the assistance of subordinates.108 The federal 
courts concluded that delegation of authority is inconsequential so long as 
the executive could control the subordinate officers, i.e., remove them 
from office.109 A few years later, however, the Supreme Court conceded 
that Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent 
agencies run by officers appointed by the president whom the president 
cannot remove, except upon good cause.110  
The independent-agency concept seemed to be settled law, but 
apparently there are limits. In Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Board,111 the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required 
“for cause” dismissal, but that also prevented the president from 
determining whether such “good cause” existed. The Supreme Court 
concluded the statute was infirm because it resulted in a “Board that is not 
accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for 
 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 105. Id. § 3. 
 106. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 107. Id. art. V, § 3.  
 108. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (citing precedent where federal 
courts have reaffirmed the view of assistance by subordinates). 
 109. Id. (invalidating act preventing the president from removing executive officers).  
 110. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).  
 111. 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010). 
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the Board.”112 And in 2018, an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit was 
pressed to rescue a Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act provision providing the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s director with a five-year term in office, subject to removal by the 
president only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”113 A panel decision that creatively held that such a director position 
was unconstitutional because the agency head was a single person, not a 
board necessitated the rescue.114 Now the Fifth Circuit has entered into the 
fray by striking down the independence of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (“FHFA”) (in partial reliance on the D.C. Circuit panel decision in 
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) on the theory that 
the FHFA was simply too independent to be constitutional.115 
On the state side, there are fewer cases that explore incursions into 
executive power. This may be because, as recognized by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court: 
Once they recognize even the general location of their limits, 
Legislature and executive are alike careful not to come even 
near an encroachment on each other’s domain. And if one 
takes place, it is likely to be suffered in silence in order to avoid 
open conflict. Especially is that so when the usurper is the 
legislative power. The executive is ordinarily too dependent 
upon the Legislature for appropriations, and too desirous of 
generosity therein, to risk the disfavor of the money distributors 
by resisting their invasions of executive domain. In 
consequence, the executive policy of nonresistance may be 
patient and endure much . . . .116 
There are, of course, limits to what the legislature can do to 
constitutional officers. “Independent core functions” of constitutional 
officers cannot be abolished.117 But short of gutting the core functions, 
Minnesota courts recognize that the power of the legislature under “Article 
V of the [Minnesota] Constitution to ‘prescribe[]’ the ‘duties’ of executive 
 
 112. Id. at 495. 
 113. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(en banc).  
 114. Id. at 110. The overturned panel decision was authored by D.C. Circuit Judge 
Brett Kavanagh, as was the underlying decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Free 
Enterprise Fund. As Brett Kavanagh now sits on the U.S. Supreme Court, he may be in a 
position to push forward his view of executive authority. 
 115. Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 666 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 116. State v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 268, 220 N.W. 951, 955 (Minn. 1928) (holding 
the Constitution puts the power to govern the University with the regents and a law giving 
administration and finance agencies authority over the University was therefore invalid). 
 117. State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986). 
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officers” includes the power to change those duties from time to time, at 
least until an agency (such as OAH) runs afoul of powers given the 
courts.118 
OAH is, as previously noted, an independent agency by design.119 
The Chief ALJ is appointed by the governor, has a six-year term, and can 
only be dismissed “for cause.”120 Federal case law121 suggests that an agency 
head who is not subject to executive authority could raise a constitutional 
question, but this arrangement seems fairly safe under Minnesota 
separation of powers jurisprudence.122 But constitutional questions may 
arise when the legislature grants OAH the authority to make final 
decisions in lieu of the agency that has jurisdiction over the programmatic 
matter at issue,123 making OAH a “super-agency” over others within the 
executive branch, outside the control of the executive.   
To be clear, OAH is not now a “super-agency” except in a very few 
areas. However, where the legislature has given OAH “super-agency” 
powers, those grants might be seen as steps down the road to a troubling 
incursion into the role of the executive under the constitution. Even short 
of such unconstitutional usurpation, the OAH “super-agency” statutes 
create confusing administrative law conundrums, as described below.  
B. OAH as a “Super-Agency”  
The legislature has given OAH “super-agency” powers in a number 
of different areas. OAH can, for example, determine whether an agency 
has violated the Minnesota Data Practices Act and impose civil penalties.124 
OAH can decide whether an agency has enforced, or attempted to 
enforce, a guidance document, fact sheet, or the like as an 
“unpromulgated rule.”125 OAH can award fees and expenses to be paid by 
 
 118. Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Minn. 2018) (citing Holmberg v. 
Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)).  
 119. Harves, supra note 23, at 259.  
 120. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3 (2018). 
 121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976), distinguished by McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 122. Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 1986). 
 123. This article refers to the agency with authority over the program as the 
“jurisdictional agency.” 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 13.085.  
 125. Id. § 14.385. Courts refer to administrative agencies’ enforcement of a policy or 
guidance document that the agency has not formally adopted as a rule as adoption of an 
“unpromulgated rule.”; see, e.g., In re Rate Appeal of Benedictine Health Ctr., 728 
N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn. 2007); St. Otto’s Home v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 
35, 42 (Minn. 1989). See generally GEORGE BECK & MEHMET KONAR-STEENBERG, 
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a state agency upon an application of a party alleging that “the position of 
the state was not substantially justified” in a contested-case hearing.126 OAH 
also can decide whether a proposed agency rule is constitutional or within 
the agency’s statutory authority if the agency attempts to adopt the rule 
using the truncated “good cause” rulemaking procedures.127  
In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard Mack v. City of 
Minneapolis, a case that put into question whether the act of the legislature 
imposing limits and allowing an administrative agency to set attorney fees 
violated the separations of power guaranteed by article III, section 1 of the 
Minnesota Constitution.128 The Minnesota Supreme Court easily batted 
away this challenge on the ground that it could ultimately review all 
attorney fees decisions.129 But Mack was followed by Quam v. State.130 
Quam was another attorney-fees question, this time arising out of the 
complicated scenario where a fee award by an ALJ under rules adopted by 
OAH was set aside by the Workers Compensation Court of Appeals 
(“WCCA”), another administrative body, on the grounds that OAH 
lacked authority to adopt the rule OAH relied upon to award attorney’s 
fees.131 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that, despite the fact that 
the legislature made WCCA the “sole, exclusive, and final authority for 
the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under 
the workers’ compensation laws,”132 the statutory grant of jurisdiction to 
WCCA could not include the power to “adjudicate the adherence of 
agency rules to their statutory parameters.”133 The court concluded that 
“[t]his function is solely within the judicial province and cannot be 
assumed by an agency tribunal without violating constitutional principles of 
separation of powers.”134 The court later concluded that statutory limits on 
attorney’s fees are unconstitutional because such limits encroach upon the 
powers of the judiciary.135  
 
MINNESOTA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE § 16.4.2 (3d ed. 2014). Courts generally will 
not defer to or enforce an agency’s “unpromulgated rule.” 
 126. MINN. STAT §§ 15.471–.474 (2018). 
 127. Id. § 14.388. 
 128. 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983). 
 129. Id.  
 130. 391 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1986). 
 131. Id. at 809. 
 132. MINN. STAT. § 175A.01, subdiv. 2 (1984).  
 133. Quam, 391 N.W.2d at 809. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Minn. 1999). For greater 
discussion of Irwin, see supra note 77. 
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So now the question arises, if WCCA cannot hold that an OAH rule 
is invalid because that is a judicial function, can OAH adjudicate similar 
questions of rulemaking authority involving another state agency? Can 
OAH issue an order to that agency, or penalize that agency? If OAH can 
decide questions of authority relating to another state agency or force it to 
act in a manner that it deems contrary to its authorities, can that agency 
appeal the OAH decision as it would if a court ruled against it? 
C. Appealing OAH Decisions 
OAH has, of course, extensive powers with regard to rulemaking. 
Under Chapter 14, agencies must establish the need for and 
reasonableness of a rule.136 Before an agency can adopt a rule, it must 
obtain OAH’s affirmation that the need for and reasonableness of a rule 
has been established.137 Under the rules that govern its rulemaking 
procedures, OAH may disapprove a rule if it finds that the rule is not 
“rationally related to the agency’s objective or the record does not 
demonstrate the need for or reasonableness of the rule,” or “exceeds, 
conflicts with, does not comply with, or grants the agency discretion 
beyond what is allowed by, its enabling statute or other applicable law,” or 
“is unconstitutional or illegal.”138 If an agency disagrees with OAH’s 
determination, it must: 
[S]ubmit the proposed rule to the Legislative Coordinating 
Commission and to the house of representatives and senate 
policy committees with primary jurisdiction over state 
governmental operations for advice and comment. The agency 
may not adopt the rule until it has received and considered the 
advice of the commission and committees. However, the agency 
is not required to wait for advice for more than 60 days after the 
commission and committees have received the agency’s 
submission.139 
After receiving this “advice,” the agency can adopt the rule regardless 
of OAH’s opinion of its legality, much as an agency is authorized to do in 
a contested case.140 Thus, although heavily and questionably eroded by the 
“laying” required at the legislature, the jurisdictional agency retains the 
 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 14.14, subdiv. 2 (2018). 
 137. Id. at § 14.15, subdivs. 3, 4.  
 138. MINN. R. 1400.2100 (2019).  
 139. MINN. STAT. § 14.15, subdiv. 4; see supra text accompanying note 53 (stating that 
a number of scholarly articles assert that this “laying” or “lodging” procedure is 
unconstitutional). 
 140. MINN. STAT. § 14.62. 
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final authority over the rule. Persons who might agree with OAH’s 
opinion (or any “advice” from legislators), can facially challenge the rule at 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals after the agency adopts it.141 These facial 
challenges are limited to a “narrow area of responsibility, lest [the court] 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”142 
Section 14.388 of the Minnesota Statutes is different, providing that 
an agency can adopt a rule without following the “normal” notice and 
comment rulemaking process (either with or without hearing) if the agency 
finds “that the rulemaking provisions of this chapter are unnecessary, 
impracticable, or contrary to the public interest.”143 However, even for a 
“good cause” rule, OAH must “approve[] the rule as to its legality.”144 
Chapter 14 also provides that OAH “shall determine whether the agency 
has provided adequate justification for its use of this section.”145 The only 
“appeal” the legislature provides from this type of OAH decision is this: 
“If a rule has been disapproved by an administrative law judge, the agency 
may ask the chief administrative law judge to review the rule.”146 Therefore, 
Chapter 14 arguably makes OAH a super-agency over the final decision 
about the legality of a “good cause” rule, in lieu of the jurisdictional 
agency. If the ALJ disapproves an agency rule adopted pursuant to this 
process, the only review provided in the statute is to the Chief ALJ.147 And, 
as the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) discovered in a 
2017 matter, that decision was the end of the process, unless the agency 
had the right to appeal OAH’s determination to the court of appeals. 
The 2017 MPCA case began when the Minnesota Legislature 
enacted legislation instructing MPCA to adopt a particular rule, with 
permissive language allowing MPCA to adopt the rule using “good cause” 
exempt rulemaking.148 Following the truncated “good cause” notice 
process, MPCA submitted the proposed rule to OAH for review.149 
Unfortunately for MPCA (or perhaps the legislature), the assigned ALJ, 
affirmed by the Chief ALJ, determined that the proposed rule was in 
conflict with the federal Clean Water Act and state authority that required 
 
 141. Id. § 14.44. 
 142. See Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. Pettersen, 347 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Minn. 1984) 
(quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1977)). 
 143. MINN. STAT. § 14.388, subdiv. 1. This is referred to as “good cause” rulemaking. 
 144. Id. § 14.386 (a)(3). 
 145. Id. § 14.388, subdiv. 1(4). 
 146. Id. § 14.388, subdiv. 3. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Act of May 30, 2017, ch. 93, § 160, 2017 Minn. Laws 97–98. 
 149. See Adopted Exempt Permanent Rule of the Minn. Pollution Control Agency 
Governing Mun. Effluent Limitations, OAH 19-9003-34654 (2017), 2017 WL 5662794. 
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the MPCA to do what is necessary to keep its delegation to implement the 
Clean Water Act. Thus, OAH concluded that the MPCA had failed to 
establish the “legality” of the proposed rule.150 Based on this reasoning, 
OAH declined to approve the rule.151  
Although MPCA arguably could have “started over” following the 
“normal” rulemaking process,152 MPCA instead sought and obtained a writ 
of certiorari against OAH.153 This created an administrative law 
conundrum: May one agency within the executive branch appeal the 
decision of another agency within the executive branch—albeit one that 
operates independently of the governor—without express statutory law 
allowing such an appeal? 
The cases provide no clear answer to this question. In 1989, the 
Minnesota Racing Commission (“Racing Commission”) held a contested 
case regarding discipline of a horse trainer and her employee for 
administering prohibited drugs to their horses.154 The assigned ALJ 
recommended against discipline of the trainer and her employee.155 The 
Racing Commission accepted this recommendation with regard to the 
employee (Haymes), but not with regard to the employer.156 Haymes then 
attempted to recover attorney fees against the Racing Commission under 
the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (“MEAJA”).157 Under MEAJA, 
in a contested case where the tribunal determines that the state’s position 
is not “substantially justified,” the “court or administrative law judge shall 
 
 150. “However well-intentioned, the amendment conflicts with existing federal and 
state laws and regulations and is illegal.” Id. at *10. 
 151. Id. 
 152. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 14.22. This would, of course, have likely resulted in the 
same determination of illegality. But if the regular rulemaking process was followed, the 
agency could adopt the rule after following the “laying” process dictated by section 14.26, 
subpart 3(c), of the Minnesota Rules.  
 153. The Minnesota Attorney General represented both sides—MPCA and OAH—in 
the appeal. This in itself poses an interesting question, but would likely pass muster. The 
Attorney General can bring an action against an agency’s former director who was 
represented by the Attorney General because the Attorney General is representing the state 
agency, and not its former director. Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 
1987). The Attorney General can also represent both a department and its commissioner 
in a contested case if separation of functions is maintained. Elim Homes, Inc. v. Minn. 
Dep’t Human Servs., 575 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 154. In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 257 (Minn. 1989). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 258. 
 157. Currently codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 15.471–.474 (2018), albeit without the 
“MEAJA” title. 
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award fees and other expenses to the party.”158 For contested cases, the 
authority appears to be a grant of a super-power to OAH. While the 
substance of the decision rests with the agency, OAH decides the question 
of the fee award. 
In Haymes, the Racing Commission did not agree with OAH’s fee 
award and appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals under that court’s 
discretionary review jurisdiction.159 The matter reached the Minnesota 
Supreme Court solely on the issue of whether the court of appeals had 
jurisdiction to entertain the Racing Commission’s petition for discretionary 
review.160 
In arguing for its right to appeal, the Racing Commission cited 
Breimhorst and Wulff to assert that “under the separation of powers 
clause of our state constitution, judicial review must be provided for 
administrative agency decisions involving the exercise of quasi-judicial 
powers.”161 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, where no 
right of discretionary review had been provided by statute or appellate 
rules, the Racing Commission was “an aggrieved party [which] has the 
common law right to petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Minn. R. 
Civ. App. P. 120 and Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (1986).”162 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court further concluded that OAH’s award of attorney fees was 
a “quasi-judicial decision.”163 This reasoning seems questionable on a 
number of grounds. First, it is not clear that state agencies have “common 
law rights.” The power of a state agency is bound by its statutory 
authority,164 although courts also sometimes find wiggle room by citing to 
“the incidental powers necessary to accomplish the duties conferred on 
[the agency].”165 Second, it is not clear that an attorney fees decision made 
by a state agency upon application under MEAJA is a “quasi-judicial 
 
 158. MINN. STAT. § 15.472(a). 
 159. In re Haymes, 427 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see MINN. R. CIV. APP. 
P. 105. 
 160. In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. 1989). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 259. 
 163. Id. Ironically, despite these findings, the Racing Commission lost the case 
because it had failed to obtain a writ of certiorari, but instead had brought a “petition for 
discretionary review.” Id.  
 164. Waller v. Powers Dep’t Store, 343 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Minn. 1984) (“Neither 
agencies nor courts may under the guise of statutory interpretation enlarge the agency’s 
powers beyond that which was contemplated by the legislative body.”). 
 165. See, e.g., In re Qwest’s Wholesale Serv. Quality Standards, 678 N.W.2d 58, 67 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (Minge, J., concurring). 
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determination.”166 The Minnesota Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that 
the assessment of penalties and sanctions by an administrative agency is 
not a factual finding but the exercise of a discretionary grant of power.”167  
Although Haymes appears to authorize a state agency to appeal 
OAH’s determination of attorney fees, a quasi-judicial determination, 
allowing a state agency to appeal an OAH rulemaking decision (i.e., the 
MPCA “good cause” rulemaking) seems a harder stretch. Rulemaking 
seems to be the classic “quasi-legislative action” that affects the rights of the 
public generally and is not specific to any particular set of facts.168 And is 
one agency within the executive branch “aggrieved” when another agency 
is given the authority to make a final decision? If the legislature made 
OAH the “superior tribunal” within the executive branch for a particular 
decision—for example, deciding the legality of a “good cause” rule—it 
seems wrong to find that another agency within the executive branch can 
be aggrieved by its decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that an 
administrative agency does not have standing to appeal a decision made by 
another agency or board sitting as a superior tribunal.169 Other statutes, 
notably section 271.06 of the Minnesota Statutes,170 expressly permit 
agencies to make appeals from administrative tribunal decisions. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized these express provisions as key 
factors in whether an agency can pursue an appeal.171 Should the courts be 
allowed to create a different path, as under Haymes?  
 
 166. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 
1999) (“[T]he three indicia of quasi-judicial actions can be summarized as follows: (1) 
investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts; (2) application of those 
facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim.”). 
 167. In re Haugen, 278 N.W.2d 75, 80 n.10 (Minn. 1979). 
 168. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 574 
(Minn. 2000); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn. 1981); 
Anderson v. Cty. of Lyon, 784 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 169. City of St. Paul v. LaClair, 479 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. 1992); Minn. State Bd. 
of Health v. Governor’s Certificate of Need Appeal Bd., 304 Minn. 209, 216–17, 230 
N.W.2d 176, 181 (1975). 
 170. MINN. STAT. § 271.06 (2018) (permitting “any political subdivision of the state, 
directly or indirectly, interested therein or affected thereby, or by the attorney general in 
behalf of the state” to appeal a tax court decision). 
 171. Minn. Water Res. Bd. v. Traverse Cty., 287 Minn. 130, 134, 177 N.W.2d 44, 47 
(1970) (“[R]ight of appeal depends largely on whether express provision is made in the 
particular statute involved.”). 
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D. OAH Defense of “Final Agency Decisions” 
Other problems arise when OAH makes the final decision for the 
executive branch. An ALJ—as would be the case for any judge—has no 
special expertise in the subject matter. Under longstanding Minnesota 
precedent, when an expert agency makes a decision, a court will give 
appropriate deference.172 When OAH makes the final decision, is it 
entitled to the same deference? At least for Minnesota Government Data 
Practices Act (MGDPA) unpromulgated rule cases173 heard before OAH, 
the answer is no and yes. In Webster v. Hennepin County,174 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court declared that it would not defer to the ALJ’s 
conclusions in making a final decision under section 13.085 of the 
Minnesota Statutes, but then applied the statutory substantial evidence 
standard under section 14.69 of the Minnesota Statutes, which accords 
essentially the same deference.175 While deference to an ALJ decision on a 
MGDPA issue may not seem that odd, the question is certainly more 
difficult where the subject matter of the dispute is specialized (say, a 
science-based water quality standard or the appropriate accounting 
method for a nursing home). In those cases, it does seem questionable to 
rely on a single non-expert judge to make that decision rather than an 
agency. Similarly, where a jurisdictional agency is operating pursuant to 
delegated authority from the federal government, it seems problematic to 
have another agency make the decision.176 
Another practical problem that arises when OAH makes the final 
decision involves OAH’s ability to defend its decision. Given OAH’s 
“judicial” function, appearing in the appeal to defend its decision seems 
akin to a district court judge appearing at the court of appeals to defend a 
decision, rather than a litigant.177 Moreover, would OAH be able to mount 
a full-throated defense of its decision given that it may lack expertise in the 
 
 172. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (1977) (“We also adhere to 
the fundamental concept that decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of 
correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies’ expertise and their 
special knowledge in the field of their technical training, education, and experience.”). 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 125.  
 174. 910 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Minn. 2018). 
 175.  MINN. STAT. § 13.085, subdiv. 5(d) (“A party aggrieved by a final decision on a 
complaint filed under this section is entitled to judicial review as provided in sections 14.63 
to 14.69.”); Webster, 910 N.W.2d at 429.  
 176. For example, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is delegated the authority 
to issue permits and establish water quality standards required by the federal Clean Water 
Act. See MINN. STAT. § 115.03, subdiv. 5. Can OAH make the final decision on a rule 
proposing a new water quality standard if it does not hold this delegation? 
 177. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 473. 
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matter?178 Even where OAH makes a decision favorable to an agency, 
generally the agency—not OAH—defends the decision on appeal.179 
However, OAH’s entry into the case may involve intervention or a 
separate appeal.180  
Unfortunately for this article, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did 
not rule on the 2017 MPCA “good cause” rulemaking matter due to 
legislative action that mooted the appeal before making a decision.181 
Nevertheless, the MPCA matter illustrates that, by making OAH a super-
agency within the executive branch, troubling complexities of 
administrative law result.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
 Given the confusion that results when OAH is given final decision 
authority, the wisdom of providing such authority to OAH must be 
questioned. Where the authority of administrative courts strays into the 
area designated to the judiciary, the courts have stated that they will abstain 
from interference based on several factors. Those factors include the 
“existence of adequate judicial checks on administrative actors, the 
function delegated, ALJ decision appealability, voluntariness of entry into 
the administrative system, and whether the legislative delegation is 
comprehensive or piecemeal.”182 Yet, in spite of these limitations, the 
legislature continues to push the limits of the separation of powers 
doctrine by continuing to give OAH authority that encroaches upon the 
express province of the judiciary.  
Courts seem more at sea as to how to deal with statutes that give 
OAH administrative super-power over other jurisdictional agencies within 
the executive branch. These statutes create a host of legal issues not easily 
 
 178. See, e.g., Petition of Brenda Loewen, No. 1-1800-14925-2, 2002 WL 31303618, 
at *3 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hearings Aug. 1, 2002). The Department of Human Services 
(“DHS”) argued that if OAH issued an order prohibiting DHS from enforcing a statute (as 
included in its disputed manual), that action “would violate the separation of powers clause 
of the Minnesota Constitution.” Id. If OAH ordered DHS to cease enforcing its statute, 
and DHS did not, would an action in district court be the result? See id. Would the district 
court reconsider the question in order to maintain “judicial control” over the executive 
branch agencies? See id.  
 179. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. of Minn., Inc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, No. 
A14-0122, 2014 WL 3892576, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2014) (demonstrating how 
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency appeared by a “related appeal” created by the 
filing of a separate writ against it). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Act of May 30, 2017, ch. 93, § 160, 2017 Minn. Laws 97–98. 
 182. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 1999). 
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untangled. Beyond these issues, the stakes increase significantly – 
particularly for the jurisdictional agency, but also for the opposing party – 
if an OAH decision becomes the final decision. If one of the legislature’s 
objectives in creating OAH as an administrative court was to simplify the 
process for decision-making, some of that simplicity may be lost. Making 
OAH the decision maker moves OAH closer to resembling a district 
court with all the associated burdens and costs. Finally, it is worth bearing 
in mind that OAH is not under political control by the governor. If the 
legislature transfers across-the-board broad powers to an executive agency 
not under the governor’s control, are constitutional questions raised, as 
they have been in federal decisions? 
 Because of the problems created when OAH is given judicial-like 
powers and broad authority over other executive branch agencies, the 
legislature should think twice when granting such powers. For matters 
encroaching on the judiciary, simple changes to the process are more 
likely to pass constitutional muster. These changes include making the 
system comprehensive, permissive, and governed by clear judicial 
oversight. These changes are preferable over mandatory administrative 
processes that only address a small portion of an administrative or legal 
scheme and delve into areas traditionally controlled by the judicial branch. 
For cases where OAH must resolve disputes involving other agencies 
within the executive branch, the better model is likely the one that is used 
for other OAH decisions under Chapter 14. Using this model, the 
opinion of the ALJ is only advisory, and the state agency must make the 
final call, subject to review by certiorari at the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals. If there is a particular reason to grant OAH the ultimate power 
to decide a matter, the grant of that power must be done with thoughtful 
safeguards, including clear authority that enables a state agency to appeal 
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